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1 Introduction
In 2008, under international pressure, the
Central African Republic (CAR) government
accepted the challenge to engage in a holistic
and comprehensive security sector reform (SSR)
process. This SSR process was launched during a
national seminar whose conclusions were
officially endorsed by President Bozizé.2
Security governance in the CAR involves a wide
range of institutional actors embedded in
networks with competing agendas and objectives.
Both national and international stakeholders are
involved in the management of the security
sector which, consequently, must be seen as
being governed increasingly on multiple levels. 
Probing the decision-making processes at stake
in security sector reform is particularly
important since security policy is traditionally
seen as the preserve of sovereign states. One
could argue, however, that the Central African
State has never been sovereign in the area of
security, due to France’s historical influence in
its security policy after Independence. 
Analysing how the SSR process in CAR has been
defined and then implemented, this article puts
emphasis on the international interactions
between institutional actors and networks that
may be geographically/territorially situated at
different levels of the policymaking process in
different places around the world, thus
suggesting ways to grasp multi-actor and multi-
sited governance. The issue here is to capture
the interactive institutional dynamics at an
international level, thus developing a
methodological framework that is likely to
capture both the top-down and the bottom-up
dynamics of decision-making processes. 
The multilevel governance (MLG) approach
offers a relevant framework in which to
investigate these inter-institutional processes,
particularly those that weaken the impact of
formal arrangements (administrative procedures
and legal frameworks), and supplement them
with informal dynamics (social network ties,
ideas and beliefs). 
Studying multilevel security governance requires
the adoption of an approach that sidesteps issues
of formal sovereignty and focuses instead on
where power is actually located, taking into
account inter-institutional relationships and the
governance arrangements in the particular social
context of the country in question – in this case
the CAR. The aim is to identify the sets of actors
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and procedures which drive the process, and to
map out the various levels at which decisions are
made.
More fundamentally, the challenge is to capture
the intermingling of domestic and international
decision-making processes into networks that
increasingly overlap and influence each other in
Southern countries. Indeed, what makes the
MLG approach different from the traditional one
– in which multiple external actors seek to
influence (or even control) the actions of
sovereign states – is the network idea.
2 Theoretical background: expanding the
multilevel governance approach beyond the
analysis of the EU 
Initially, the multilevel governance approach
aimed to analyse the changing relationships
between actors situated at different territorial
levels, both from the public and private sectors,
in the context of European integration (Hooghe
and Marks 1999). Research based on a multilevel
governance approach deals mainly with the
complexity of decision-making processes within
the European Union (EU) itself.3
Recently, the multilevel governance approach has
been expanded to emphasise the role of the many
actors involved in EU foreign policy, and the ways
in which they interact with each other. According
to Smith (2003) multilevel governance refers to
the sharing of authority across an
institutionalised, hierarchically structured set of
actors with varying degrees of unity/coherence,
commitment to EU norms and power resources.4
Most of the research that uses an MLG approach
is primarily focused on the decision-making
processes in EU circles. These streams of
research do not, however, take into consideration
the fact that, with governance being
‘internationally multi-sited’, there is a dire need
to integrate local partners into the analysis. Yet,
the MLG approach can offer a relevant
framework in which to study governance in
Southern countries, if complemented and
combined with other frameworks of analysis. 
2.1 Dispersed governance: identifying the distribution
of power
Bache (2008a, 2008b) states, ‘Multilevel
governance is an intuitively appealing concept
that offers some insights and informs a research
agenda… There is a need for empirical research
on multilevel governance that adopts a more
critical stance on the issue of power’ and is
informed by the following requirements:
1 A clear explanation of its assumptions in
relation to the nature and location of power
and ‘a need to explicitly theorise how actors’
power is structured... within governance
arrangements’. A good starting point is to
situate MLG in relation to three aspects of
the power and policymaking debate:
(1) decision-making; (2) agenda-setting; and
(3) preference-shaping. 
2 Clearer empirical benchmarks for what does
and does not constitute multilevel governance.
Understanding the distribution of financial,
informational, political, organisational and
constitutional-legal resources, and the skills
with which actors use them is key to
explaining policy-decision and outcome-
implementation matters.
3 Explicit theorising on the relationships
between actors, governance arrangements and
social context (e.g. formal rules, rules of the
games, type of network). There is a need to
investigate less tangible forms of power by
relating governance dynamics to the context
(Bache 2008a).
2.2 Emphasising the importance of policy networks 
What is distinctive about the MLG approach is
not only its emphasis on a multiplicity of actors
across levels of the system but also of the
networks they constitute. This connects to the
‘policy network approach’. 
Policy networks analysis does not deny the power
of classical actors such as national governments
but contends that policy outcomes cannot be
explained exclusively by national preferences or
interests. 
The policy network approach states that networks
can be more than the sum of their parts and
produce outcomes which are not simply a
summation of the views of their most powerful
members; the influence exercised by the network
is seen as an emergent property. The ability of the
network to shape outcomes comes from its
interactions and the complexities of the ways in
which actors influence one another through them.5
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Two streams of policy network literature are
particularly relevant to this study. The first
insists on resources dependencies, the second on
the importance of beliefs. 
Benson (1982) defines policy networks as a cluster
of ‘organisations connected to each other by
resource dependencies and distinguished from
other clusters by breaks in the structure of
resource dependencies’. Stephen George (1997)
develops a similar perspective, considering that
policy networks are characterised by the pattern of
resource interdependence between the
organisations in the network. To Kenis and
Schneider (1989) too, the boundaries of a policy
network are not determined by institutions or
formal distribution of power but by a mutual
recognition of resource dependencies. Resource
dependencies are also a major aspect of the
famous Rhodes model, which focuses on the way in
which networks are structured in a policy sector.6
Investigating policy networks in the European
Security and Defence Policy and how social network
ties and beliefs affect the decision-making process,
Mérand asserts a policy domain approach is best
suited for a relational understanding of policy-
making that focuses not only on governments and
formal organisations but also on social relationships
and beliefs affinities among organisational actors
such as diplomats, parliamentarians, defence
experts, etc. (Mérand 2009).7
2.3 Multi-sited governance: bringing the ‘policy
transfer approach’ into the analysis
Most scholars who refer to the multilevel
governance approach have left out the question
of the impact that national partners have on the
policies supported by international actors. In
other words, national actors are treated as being
outside the network or in a separate one. The
multilevel governance approach has to be
deepened and enriched with the burgeoning
literature on ‘policy transfer’. 
Stubbs highlights the need to conceptualise and
understand the decision-making processes ‘in
terms of complex overlapping networks’ (2005).
To do so, he refers to the ‘policy transfer’
approach, defined by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000). 
Stubbs highlights the importance of taking into
account the dimensions of ‘policy resistance’ and
‘resistance strategies of apparently weak groups
in the context of asymmetric dependencies’.
Using contributions from anthropology he
advocates an understanding of how international
decision-making processes interact with formal
and informal channels of decision at the national
level in partner countries. His interest is not just
on formal decision-making processes, but also on
semi-formal and informal ones.
Stubbs however, has not paid enough attention to
the role played by networks per se. The most
powerful approach to policy transfer integrating
a network analysis is with no doubt the ‘external
governance approach’. Lavenex (2004) has
suggested a framework for analysing the EU’s
external effects on non-EU member states,
whereby the scope and shape of policy transfer is
conditioned by existing institutional links
between the EU and the other countries, the
latter’s immediate domestic situation, and the
costs of non-adaptation associated with an EU
policy. On the one hand, networks can be
instrumentalised as alternative instruments of
policy transfer, thus compensating for
weaknesses of strategic conditionality. On the
other hand, their participatory potential is
currently hampered by heterogeneous political
structures, unequal expertise and policy
traditions in countries (Lavenex 2008).
This article will mostly refer to the literature on
MLG focused on the EU context. However, some
conflict literature has also advocated a global-to-
local approach, whilst some authors have
considered how violence and armed groups are
networked across national borders (Schlichte and
Veit 2007). Likewise, there is an important and
fast-growing literature on the hybridity of
African states and of their governance
arrangements, which has put the stress on
multilayered governance and networked power in
development/conflict contexts. Bayart (1989)
deals with the formal institutions of the modern
state exported by the French colonial power,
analysing the extent to which African governments
have shaped the outcomes and appropriated
Western governmental institutions to pursue
long-established strategies. Banegas (2003) has
analysed the same dynamics at stake in electoral
democracies, confirming Bayart’s conclusions. 
There is also a long tradition of organisation
theory, going back to the French sociologist Michel
Crozier (1964), which has focused on informal
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networks and forms of power in bureaucracies.
Focusing on their respective social systems –
namely interpersonal relations, group relations,
and power relations – Crozier challenged and re-
examined Weber’s concept of efficient ideal
bureaucracy in light of the way institutional
bureaucracies have actually developed. Such a
theory inspired the way in which Robin Luckham
(1971) analysed the micropolitics of military and
security institutions in Nigeria. 
This article suggests an analysis of the security
governance arrangements aimed at capturing
the distribution of power in the social context of
the CAR, by analysing the kinds of resources
that are mobilised by different networks of actors
(domestic and international) at every stage of
the decision-making process. 
To capture multilevel, multi-sited governance,
there is a need to focus both on the formulation
(agenda-setting and programming) phase and the
implementation (managing and monitoring) phase
of policymaking.8 Indeed, security governance in
CAR involved a wide range of domestic
stakeholders (national authorities as well as non-
governmental, and non-state actors) and
international actors (international organisations as
well as other states) intervening along with
specific policymaking processes (both formal and
informal), which themselves interacted and
interfered with each other. Consequently, security
governance resulted, to a large extent, from the
interactions between the resources mobilised
respectively by the international and the domestic
networks during the policymaking processes. 
I propose to capture power distribution in CAR’s
security governance by identifying the material
and normative resources that were mobilised by
international and national actors involved in
security governance in the CAR since the SSR
process was launched, namely the EU,9 France and
national stakeholders (both governmental and
non-governmental) at (1) the policy formulation
phase (agenda-setting and programming), and
(2) the implementing phase (managing and
monitoring). The aim is to capture both power
distribution between and within policy networks. 
3 Policy formulation phase: agenda-setting and
programming 
To identify the distribution of power during the
agenda-setting/programming phases, there is a
need to identify who provided the guidelines, set
the priorities, and defined the general purpose of
the SSR process in CAR and to identify who was
involved in programming the different stages of
the process. Throughout the policy formulation
phase, three kinds of resources were primarily
mobilised: normative resources, assessment
resources and programmatic resources. 
3.1 Normative resources
Studying normative resources enables one to
capture the representation of security that
underlies the approach of each set of
stakeholders. Normative resources here refer
both to values and systems of beliefs as well as
the way in which a problem is conceptualised –
that is, what the problem is thought to be and
the range of possible solutions or responses to it
that are considered viable. This emphasises the
representation of security in a context marked by
a plurality of actors with different objectives,
strategies and expectations. 
3.1.1 Multilateral stakeholders: the central role of the EU
The EU was one of the most important
international actors that supported the SSR
process in CAR. EU SSR documents explicitly
refer to the SSR guidelines (Security System
Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice)
adopted by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development/Development
Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) and
translated into political and operational
principles in the OECD Handbook on Security
Systems Reform: Supporting Security and Justice
(OECD 2007).10 The SSR process supported in
CAR by the EU appears as an ideal-type
illustration of the holistic approach developed by
the OECD/DAC, wherein security sector reform
seeks to increase partner countries’ ability to
meet the range of security needs within their
societies in a manner consistent with democratic
norms and sound principles of governance,
transparency and the rule of law. It is important
here to note that the SSR concept itself, as
framed by the OECD, promotes a multilevel
approach of security governance. Furthermore,
the OECD/DAC Manual strongly envisages the
role that international partners are likely to play
when providing support to SSR processes:
international donors are seen as an integral part
of the multilayered governance system
promoted through SSR (OECD 2007: 63–86 and
section 8). 
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At the EU level, the endorsement of the SSR
concept by the European Commission (EC) has
clearly been driven by the Directorate General
for Development (DG Development, often
referred as DG Dev).11
Within the Commission, it thus has been the
‘development network’ (DG Dev and its
connections with other development agencies) that
has been driving the SSR-related policy. Endorsing
a human security-based concept, the DG Dev has
increasingly promoted an approach to security
focused on individuals’ physical security and the
protection of their rights. Consequently, the
approach the Commission promotes is
‘governance-oriented’ in the sense that it is
centred on good governance and the promotion of
human rights, which implies that security can no
longer be seen as the preserve of the state but has
to involve a wider range of stakeholders. 
3.1.2 Bilateral stakeholders: the role of France12
Since the Independence of the Oubangui-Chari
provinces, France has been the main bilateral
actor in the Central African Republic and has
been deeply involved in the governance of the
security sector there.13
However, due to the growing accusation of
paternalism, neocolonialism and complicity with
authoritarian (and the case of the Rwanda
‘genocidaire’) regimes, France has been eager to
obtain a multilateral legitimacy for its
interventions on the African continent and has
been increasingly integrating its interventions
within the EU framework. Charbonneau (2008)
provides an interesting analysis of this. 
The French security policy in CAR is a perfect
example of the process through which French
security policy has been modified and adapted to
fit into the system of liberal security governance
promoted at the EU level. The SSR paradigm as
promoted by the EU has given a new legitimacy
to the traditional French security policy,
especially to the military and technical
permanent assistance. 
3.1.3 CAR domestic stakeholders
Different representations of security reform
competed among the Central African Republic’s
domestic actors. First, the CAR’s political actors
(governmental authorities, opposition parties
and rebel groups) referenced a very traditional
vision of security: security reform was seen as a
means of building up a security apparatus
(essentially a militarised one) that could
guarantee the state’s legitimate violence and
thus ensure political continuity and the
hegemonic position of ruling actors. The context
of war, which had prevailed in CAR for more
than a decade, deepened this tendency. It is
extremely important to mention the fact that
almost all the influential political actors on the
CAR political scene today have been playing a
leading role in national politics for decades: most
of them have occupied the highest functions
(former Presidents of the Republic, Ministers of
Defence, Prime Ministers, Chiefs of Staff) before
joining the ranks of different rebel outfits or of
the opposition. Thus it is possible to identify
what can be called a ‘ruling elites network’,
made up of politicians, high-ranking officers and
rebel group leaders. Interactions between the
members of this network are informed by a
subtle game of solidarities as well as rivalries. All
these political leaders have considered the
military as the best instrument to support their
access to power and for 20 years the successive
Heads of State have attempted to
instrumentalise the armed forces in order to
perpetuate their dominant position. In the
government’s view, SSR mainly – if not
exclusively – amounted to reinforcing the
military’s skills. The role of the police was
considered marginal since the armed forces had
always been used to perform traditional police
work. In sum, the sense of security developed by
the CAR’s political elites’ network
fundamentally differed from the normative
approach promoted by the OECD and
international actors such as the EU. 
Beyond political circles, it is possible to identify
two alternative representations of security
reform which were widespread among two other
sets of Central African actors:
z Security actors themselves: the armed forces,
police forces (mid-level officers and rank
agents) and other security services
(intelligence services, customs, water/forest
services) form a ‘national security network’:
they developed an approach to security reform
that was mostly focused on the ways in which
their working conditions and individual
financial and social conditions could improve.
The most widespread claims among security
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providers themselves were systematic
demands for the payment of back pay; regular
access to the so-called PGA (Prime Générale
d’Alimentation – food allowance); free access to
medical care; construction of barracks where
families could be accommodated; supply of
new equipment; and access to training. 
z The population at large: the civilian population,
especially in the provinces, has suffered for
years from the abuses committed by the armed
forces with total impunity (Human Rights
Watch 2007) and from their inability to cope
with new threats they are confronted with on a
daily basis (such as the so-called zaraguinas –
the road-cutters).14 There is also a lot of
suspicion towards the police force, which is
mainly seen as corrupt and extortionist.
Consequently, the populations’ definition of
security reform was mainly framed in terms of
physical safety, which non-state security actors
(vigilante groups set up by the villagers
themselves) or customary actors (traditional
justice providers), were seen as the most likely
to provide. The CAR population cannot of
course be seen as a network per se: but it
undoubtedly saw its own security as better
ensured if and when embedded in
communitarian and traditional networks. In
CAR, a large part of the population relies on a
variety of traditional and religious conflict-
resolution mechanisms other than the formal
state systems. International actors increasingly
tend to acknowledge the existence and
relevance of these systems. However, some of
these systems legitimise practices – for
instance, the persecution of alleged ‘witches’ –
which do not uphold international human
rights standards as promoted by the
OECD/DAC approach to SSR. 
Finally, it is important to mention that, whilst
the OECD approach considers the role of civil
society as crucial in the politics of security sector
reform (see Caparini 2005), in the CAR it is hard
to identify a strongly structured civil society. A
number of associations (human rights defenders,
women’s associations) do exist, the most
important of which are structured around
religious networks, mainly Christian in essence.
However, at the time of the reform, such
organisations had not formed any constituency
nor developed any advocacy actions to represent
citizens’ views and monitor the activities of state
security institutions. 
3.2 Assessment resources
The agenda-setting phase of the SSR process in
CAR sheds light on the important role
international experts played in the policymaking
process. 
A team made up of international (non-African)
experts, from a variety of backgrounds (both
academic and practitioner) was initially set up to
make a comprehensive assessment of the CAR’s
security apparatus. The team clearly promoted
the views and beliefs promoted by the DG Dev
and favoured a human security-based approach
to SSR. Their assessment was central in defining
the agenda: Haas’ definition (1992) of an
epistemic community as ‘a network of
professionals with recognised expertise and
competence in a particular domain and an
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge
within that domain or issue-area’ perfectly
describes the connections that existed between
the DG Dev and the external experts in the
CAR’s SSR process.15
In contrast, the influence of Central African
nationals in the agenda-setting process was
marginal. A National Preparatory Committee,
made up of Central African personalities, was set up
to prepare the National SSR Seminar. The National
Seminar itself formally involved an important
number of Central African participants (both from
governmental and non-governmental circles).
However, most of the Central African stakeholders
involved in the assessment process were hardly able
to mobilise credible expertise. Seeing the striking
lack of national assessment capacities, the
international partners finally decided to send an
international SSR team from the OECD to train all
members of the Preparatory Committee. National
stakeholders thus were influenced in developing
their own conceptions of security by their
incorporation into the international SSR networks.
The views of international experts – themselves
converted to the human security-based approach to
SSR – largely framed the agenda and the two-year
timeline of the SSR process.
3.3 Programmatic resources
The mobilisation of programmatic resources is
meant to identify the priorities, establish a
hierarchy between them, and select appropriate
resources and funding mechanisms in order to
set up a planning programme. The resources for
SSR were mobilised by three international actors
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– the EC, the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) and France – and were
combined to put SSR on CAR’s agenda: goals,
objectives and timelines were defined in order to
fit into the Poverty Reduction Strategy. 
The identity of the EU institutional actors involved
in SSR-related programmes in CAR was, to a large
extent, derived from the financial instruments
dedicated to external assistance. The Directorate
General for External Relations (DG Relex)16 and
DG Dev were involved in the programming phase
of the SSR process in CAR,17 as was the EuropeAid
office. The role of the ‘Brussels-based development
network’ was thus central. 
Another key EC actor in this programming phase
was the EU Delegation18 in the CAR capital,
Bangui, which played a pivotal role, both at the
political and technical level, acting as an
interface between the Directorates-General in
Brussels and the international19 and national
stakeholders in CAR. This pivotal role sheds light
on the major importance – often underestimated
– of the EU Delegation in European foreign and
security policy decision-making processes.
Focusing on processes of knowledge production
and implementation, Schlichte and Veit (2007)
develop the model of ‘coupled arenas’ and argue
that the ‘outcomes of state-building policies have
to be “associated with organisational problems
and connected ways of perceiving reality within
interventionists” camps’. The activities of
international agencies active in the field of peace
and state-building are occurring in different
locations simultaneously and policy outcomes can
be better understood when conceived as the
results of the interactions between actors in three
different arenas, namely: the metropolitan (most
of the time Western) headquarters, national base
camps (located in the capital of partner/recipient
countries) and local offices ‘in the bush’. These
three different arenas are interactive, for
instance through financial resources or staff
transfer which are both top-down and bottom-up
in essence (e.g. financial resources transferred
from the headquarters to the field and knowledge
and information acquired locally which are
transferred by agents located on the ground). 
To better understand the policy outcomes
therefore, it is necessary to integrate into the
analysis the European decision-making process,
actors which are based in partner countries,
namely the EU in-country representatives (the
EU Delegation) and the representatives of EU
member states (the embassies and the
cooperation services affiliated to them). In fact,
the programmatic phase of the SSR process has
also been highly shaped by the interactions
between the EU Delegation and France. Being a
leading member of the EU – especially with
regard to EU Development policy – as well as the
major bilateral player in CAR, France has both an
‘inside’ and ‘outside partner’ role with the EU
delegation, which together with its long
experience in the country, has reinforced its
influence on EU policy in the CAR. In the
programmatic phase, France proved to be eager to
see its own bilateral policy integrated into the SSR
process. One of its requirements was to have its
traditional military and security cooperation
network fully associated with the design of the
SSR programmes funded by the EC. It also proved
eager to ensure that the social interests of the
security services were taken into account in the
two-year timeline. Whilst the CAR government
did not manage to promote the social condition of
the security services (excepting those of the
presidential guard and other praetorian services),
the traditional French cooperation networks have
been very efficient in supporting the claims of the
CAR security network, on behalf of the ‘arms
fraternity’ (fraternité d’armes). 
3.4 Distribution of power in the policy formulation phase
The OECD/DAC approach to SSR endorsed by
the EU fundamentally challenges the state-
centric and sovereign conception of security: it
aims to broaden the set of actors involved in
security policy beyond government circles.
Through SSR, the EU in particular and
development agencies more generally are
fundamentally trying to change power
relationships in Southern countries by making
policymaking processes more inclusive and
accountable. From this point of view, the
OECD/EU approach to SSR is an illustration of
governance as defined by Marcussen and Torfing
(2007) who consider that ‘governance implies a
decentring of governing away from the state and
a pluralisation of actors involved in governing’. 
France has both supported and counterbalanced
this approach: whilst French diplomatic actors
have clearly endorsed the human security-driven
agenda, it has also been agreed that the
traditional ‘French military/security cooperation
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network’ would stay fully involved in the
definition of the SSR agenda. This network thus
acted as a mediator to promote the social claims
of the CAR’s military staff. But it was also very
sensitive to the views of the ruling elite network,
seen as the best guarantee of perpetuating a
political order conducive to some kind of stability
in the region. 
Yet, the vision of security promoted through the
SSR concept was not in accordance with the
vision of security which was most widespread
among CAR’s political stakeholders, in and out
of government. However, CAR political actors
were not able to mobilise assessment and
programming resources to promote their own
conception of security reform, which was
primarily seen as a means of reinforcing the
military apparatus. Central African actors were
not able to mobilise significant expertise and
programmatic resources to have a major impact
on the formulation phase. The solutions
privileged by the CAR population to meet their
definition of security (which mostly amount to
physical security and in fact are not very
concerned with matters of transparency and
accountability) were not taken into account. 
Consequently, the SSR process was almost
exclusively framed by international actors (mainly
the European development network and the
French coopérants networks). It is difficult to
identify any major influence by the national actors.
4 Implementing phase: managing and monitoring 
To assess the distribution of power in this
implementing phase, I will focus on four kinds of
resources: institutional, technical, financial, and
monitoring. 
4.1 Institutional resources
Three kinds of institutional resources are
considered in the following paragraphs:
constitutional, legislative, and decentralised
resources. The issue is to determine the extent to
which the CAR institutional framework was
conducive to democratic security governance as
defined by the OECD/EU doctrines. Indeed, it is
highly important for SSR processes to be tailored
to the institutional regime of the partner country. 
The new Constitution of the Central African
Republic, adopted by referendum on 5 December
2004, was promulgated on 28 December 2004.
Elaborated on the basis of the previous
Constitution of 14 January 1995, this new
fundamental law established a semi-presidential
regime. The constitutional framework is largely
inspired by the French Fifth Republic
Constitution, which formally favours the
concentration of power in the hands of the
Presidency. According to the Constitutions, the
President of the Republic, as Supreme Chief of
the Armed Forces, is able to define the national
defence policy, which is executed by the Minister
of the Armed Forces, under the aegis of the
Prime Minister. As in most Francophone African
countries, these constitutional provisions have
resulted in a situation where the security domain
is, to a large extent, the exclusive monopoly of
the President, assisted by a limited circle of
civilian and military advisers (Bagayoko 2010). In
addition, since 2003, the President of the
Republic has concurrently held the role of
Minister of Defence, in violation of Article 23 of
the Constitution, which stipulates that the
function of the President of the Republic is
incompatible with the exercise of any other
political function. Under international pressure,
the President finally decided to create the post of
Minister of State for Defence, which he
conferred on his son. 
One of the central objectives of the SSR process is
the promotion of the role of parliament in the
supervision and oversight of the defence and
security institutions. In the CAR, the parliament
is unicameral: the National Assembly consists of
105 representatives. Between 2005 and 2010, the
Central African National Assembly was
dominated by representatives associated with
President Bozizé. According to Article 61 of the
Central African Constitution, the National
Assembly is empowered to exercise parliamentary
control over the defence and security forces. Two
parliamentary committees are in charge of
security matters: the ‘Defence’ Committee, in
charge of questions relating to the Forces Armées de
Centrafriques (FACA – Central African armed
forces) and to the gendarmerie, and the ‘Home/Law’
Committee, in charge of questions relating to the
internal security forces. These Committees are
endowed with the power of inquiry and are
supposed to control ministerial responsibility
through oral or written questions, or can even
vote for a censure motion against ministers; they
are also supposed to approve and control the
defence and security budget and to supervise the
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interventions of the armed and security forces. In
practice, however, the parliamentarians do not
exercise the powers they are entrusted by the
Constitution. In fact, empowering the National
Assembly as planned by the SSR process largely
amounts to reinforcing the government itself,
given that the Central African National Assembly
is dominated by parliamentarians belonging to
political parties associated with the President.
Consequently, most of the members of the
Defence and the Internal Affairs Committees
belong to parties from the majority group and are
very unlikely to launch information enquiries or to
adopt legislation that the government does not
agree with. It is worth noting as well that it is
hard to consider the political parties not affiliated
to the presidential majority as opposition groups:
most of the members of these parties have
participated in one way or another in successive
governments of the current regime, confirming
the prevalence of a ruling elites network.
Nevertheless, the democratic legitimacy of the
Central African parliamentarians cannot be
denied: indeed, the unquestionably fair legislative
elections of May 2005 truly gave the head of state
a majority in parliament. Yet, it is also an
unquestionable fact that most of the political
groups in the National Assembly have been
chaired by close relatives of the President. 
The SSR process planned to increase the
influence of decentralised actors over security
governance. The objective was to create zones of
defence in order to develop a ‘défense de proximité’
(defence of proximity): these zones of defence
were to coincide with the government of
administrative regions and were meant to be
managed by the prefects of each zone. The idea
was to confer on the prefect the responsibility for
coordinating the troops deployed in his prefecture.
It was also planned to reinforce the municipal
police forces and consequently the power of the
mayors who are legally responsible for overseeing
those forces. Yet these zones of defence, as well as
the regions, are empty shells. Indeed,
administrative regions were created on paper and
should be headed by governors.20 Law 88.005 and
Order 88.006 of 5 and 12 February 1988
determine the administrative organisation of CAR
and override Laws 64/32 and 64/33 of 20
November 1964. However, both the 1988 orders
have been only partially implemented so far. The
municipality is a territorial jurisdiction, consisting
of villages, districts, areas and neighbourhoods,
the territorial limits of which are determined by
law. According to the texts, mayors are elected by
the city council, which is itself elected for five
years. However, no municipal election has ever
been organised in the Central African Republic
and, at present, mayors are appointed by the
central power by decrees or orders. Besides,
mayors failing in their duties can be revoked by
the President of the Republic. Moreover, in spite
of the 1988 laws, there were no prefects in the
regions (provinces) until 2003: instead, military
governors managed administration and police
problems. Consequently, it was doubtful that
increasing the responsibilities of decentralised
actors as envisioned by the SSR process would
result in a more balanced management of the
security sector.
4.2 Financial resources
As one of the poorest countries in the world, the
Central African state clearly could not mobilise
the financial resources needed to fund a holistic
SSR process. In fact, funding was almost
exclusively provided by the international
community. 
However, international donors only had partial
control over the resources they provided to fund
the SSR process. The CAR government was
largely able to control the way in which the
financial resources dedicated to the SSR process
were used, particularly those dedicated to the
defence sector. The budget of the armed forces
appears to be only symbolic. It is extremely
difficult for parliamentarians and oversight
bodies (auditor general, inspector general,
ombudsman, Audit Account Court) to obtain
information about the realities of the defence
budget. A number of international experts (both
contracted by multilateral donors and by France)
also confessed that the question of the defence
budget remained totally mysterious to them: the
issue was too sensitive for them to dare ask
questions (interviews with representatives of
international donors, Bangui, April 2008). 
This situation partly explains why one of the key
objectives of the SSR process was to introduce
transparency and sound principles in the
management of the security sector, particularly
by favouring the development of auditing
capacities. However, most of the institutions and
procedures that international partners tried to
support were deprived of any significant
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influence over the budgeting process. For
instance, whilst the Audit Account Court was
seen by international donors as a key
independent oversight body, the magistrates
from this jurisdiction confessed to being very
reluctant to control the expenses of the security
sector, tacitly considered as the exclusive
monopoly of the Head of State (interviews with
representatives of international donors, Bangui,
April 2008). Furthermore, the Audit Account
Court was not given any means by the
government or the parliament to fulfil its
missions. Similarly, the parliament has voted on
security budgets as requested by the government
without being given any information regarding
its content. 
In fact, it appears that even external funds
cannot be sufficiently controlled through the
national budget system: the audit and control
procedures are not functioning and the
budgeting process is in fact largely controlled not
by the government as such, but exclusively by the
Presidency. 
4.3 Technical resources
International experts were very important
players in the implementation process through
the set up of the multidisciplinary SSR advisory
team, responsible for assisting the Central
African stakeholders in the implementation of
the reforms. This team was jointly supported by
the EU and the UNDP. France was able to
integrate its own national experts into the EU-
funded team. Those experts – who were also
involved in the formulation phase as mentioned
above – were very close to the Central African
military and security elites. It was also a means
for France to share some costs of its bilateral
defence and security cooperation. 
Regarding domestic expertise, most of the
national experts who were designated to
implement the SSR process (especially the ‘point
focaux’ responsible for coordinating the reforms
in each area of the security sector) belonged to
the ‘first proximity circle’ of the President. They
largely implemented the technical options
designed by the EU-funded team or by French
technical advisors. 
4.4 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) resources
Monitoring resources are mobilised to review
progress and achievement and to evaluate the
impact of the SSR process. In the CAR’s SSR
process, monitoring resources were exclusively
mobilised by international actors: the EU
Delegation was responsible, in cooperation with
EuropeAid, for coordinating all the assistance
provided by different Directorate Generals of the
Commission (Directorate General for External
Relations; Directorate General for Development;
EuropeAid) and for evaluating and auditing the
reform process. The experts mobilised for M&E-
related tasks were more or less the same
individuals who had previously been mobilised in
the assessment phase and who belonged to the
Brussels-based development network. 
4.5 Distribution of power in the implementation phase
The implementation phase of the CAR’s SSR
process was clearly dominated by the
government and more precisely by the
Presidency, which proved able to control both an
important part of the financial resources (which
were almost exclusively provided by
international partners) and the institutional
resources located in non-governmental
policymaking circles (especially the
parliamentarians and the decentralised actors). 
Today, as an International Crisis Group (ICG
2007) report succinctly underlines, the real
power is monopolised by the President of the
Republic and his close relatives.21 Inter-
institutional relationships in CAR are
underpinned by a complex system of processes
and interfaces of a non-institutional nature.
Informal links and structures of power based on
such factors as ethnic group, family and informal
political connections count as much as the
formal institutional mechanisms (Bigo 1988).
Put another way, inter-institutional relationships
in the CAR’s social context are working ‘via a
range of subjective interfaces and partnerships of
which the formal mechanisms are either a
component thereof or are, alternatively, merely
the formal expression of these power relations’
(Williams 2005).22 Governance is networked in
the CAR but the informal social and political
solidarity networks do not necessarily contribute
to the democratic governance of the security
sector: the actors that the international
stakeholders thus sought to mobilise are in fact
controlled by the government, which did not
have the same agenda or at least the same
definition of security as the one underlying the
SSR concept.
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Consequently, international stakeholders such as
the EU only had limited influence on the
implementation of the SSR process – essentially
exercised via their financial and monitoring
resources. The most influential international
actor in the implementation phase was clearly
France through its technical, military and
security advisors. 
5 Conclusion
The case study of the SSR process in the Central
African Republic shows how decision-making
competencies are shared amongst a variety of
actors, internationally located at different
territorial and institutional levels and organised
around different networks. Investigating the
kind of power distribution at stake in the SSR
process clearly suggests that there is a growing
dispersion of power in the CAR’s security
governance. 
The policy networks at stake in the security
sector reform process in the CAR were namely:
z The European Union development community, which
promoted a governance approach to security
based on the human security paradigm and
formed an epistemic community made up of
experts from some member states and civil
servants from the European Commission;
z The French traditional security cooperation network,
which promoted a more classical perspective
of security assistance and whose fundamental
objective was stability. Through this network,
France was present at almost all levels of the
policymaking process (both in the formulation
and implementation phase);
z The CAR’s ruling elites network which adhered to a
very traditional approach to SSR. Whilst
unable to enforce such a perspective during the
formulation phase of the SSR process, this
network was able to dominate the
implementation process and control both the
financial resources and the domestic actors
supposed to supervise use of the security forces.
New international players such as the EU (and
the UNDP) were undoubtedly able to set up new
priorities and conceptions of security in CAR.
Their influence over the outcomes was in fact
largely limited to the policy formulation phase.
The implementation phase, however, was mostly
dominated by the Central African executive
power, which was the only actor able to mobilise
and control both the local resources and, to a
lesser extent, some of the international resources. 
The approach to security sector reform, as
promoted by multilateral actors, is mainly framed
in terms of technical questions of coordination
and political questions of democratic governance.
Such an approach interfered with the CAR’s value
systems and patronage networks, which were
largely dominated by the ruling political elite.
One of the main problems of the EU SSR concept,
itself derived from the OECD approach, is that it
is too often based on theoretical models that are
drawn from Western political science and which
are of limited use in understanding how the
security sector actually works in practice in
African states. It is then necessary to take into
consideration the microsocial dynamics and the
diverse forms of organisation and civil control,
which are unconstrained by formal legality, and
which involve other social processes and
interfaces. A wide range of informal procedures
shape decision-making in the CAR, and interfere
with the norms and procedures that are promoted
by multilateral actors. These kinds of informal
processes, often rooted in kinship, customary and
patronage networks but also in shadow-political
networks, co-exist with the state’s formal decision-
making structures, inspired by the Weberian
rationalist organisational model (inherited from
French colonial rule) and increasingly by the
decentralised mechanisms that multilateral actors
are attempting to introduce via the SSR process.
Furthermore, the actors that can be seen as an
immediate alternative, or rather a complement
to the presidential security apparatus, are
presently not located in the check-and-balance
institutions inspired by the Western institutional
model. These actors can be seen as belonging to
two categories: first, the vigilante and self-
defence groups (the so-called ‘local forces’ and
‘archers’) established by the villagers in the
provinces; secondly, traditional and customary
justice institutions. However, these actors, even if
meeting some expectations of the population, do
not always intervene on behalf of the democratic
and human rights standards promoted by the
SSR concept. 
The multilevel governance approach – when
complemented by a ‘policy/social network
approach’ and by the policy transfer approach,
which stresses informal, loose structures, network
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ties and belief affinities that extend across, and
beyond, hierarchies – is well-equipped to grasp
such processes. Indeed, the value that is added by
a multilevel governance approach is that it goes
beyond formal organisational arrangements, and
formal decision-making mechanisms, recognising
complexity far more than traditional politico-
administrative models do. The multilevel
governance approach can provide a relevant
framework to study the ways in which domestic
security governance in some African countries is
reshaped by the interactions of the
heterogeneous norms, standards and procedures
underlying international and domestic decision-
making processes, which thus contribute to
challenging the state-centric definition of
sovereign security governance. 
The question of the state-centric notion of
sovereignty does matter, particularly in the
context of a policy aimed at reforming a sector
that is traditionally at the core of state
institutions. But investigating the SSR process in
CAR through a multilevel governance approach
allows one to incorporate sovereignty and the
informal realities of multiple actors and
processes, thus enabling one to draw conclusions
about the kind of security governance that is
emerging in the Central African context. The
security sector, traditionally seen as the preserve
of the sovereign state, is no longer centrally
governed, but increasingly multilevel governed.
However, this situation does not mean that the
Central African state has lost its prominence in
the realm of security. At present, local or
indigenous procedures as well as political and
patronage networks controlled by the ruling elite
are likely to prevail over technical procedures
and inclusive governance arrangements
promoted by international actors.23
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Notes
1 This article is based on field research which
was carried out between 2008 and 2010. 
2 Crucial Steps: Security Sector Reform in CAR,
report published with the support of the
UNDP, http://hdptcar.net/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2008/06/undp_ssr_report_
may_2008.pdf (accessed 29 March 2012).
3 For a critical overview of the literature dealing
with a governance approach to European
integration, see Jachtenfuchs (2001).
4 From this perspective, Michael Smith’s (2003)
approach to multilevel governance is related to
the ‘actor-centred institutionalist approach to
policy research’ proposed by Scharpf (1997) –
and derived from the study of political-
organisational fields. Scharpf ’s approach
focuses on the ‘policy domain concept’, defined
as the set of groups and organisations active in
formulating, advocating and selecting policy
options. The basic idea of the ‘policy domain’
concept is that ‘the solutions to a given policy
problem must be produced by the
interdependent choices of a plurality of policy
actors with specific capabilities and with
specific perceptions and preferences regarding
the outcomes that could be obtained’. 
5 A lot of criticism has been formulated against
the policy network approach, for example:
Thatcher (1998) and Koenig (1998), who
consider that policy network is only ‘a useful
metaphor, but does not constitute a model or
theory’. Richardson (2000) considers that
policymaking at the EU level is too fluid for
stable networks to exist or persist. 
6 In the Rhodes model (Rhodes 1997a, 1997b)
the following factors are emphasised: resource
dependencies; the relative stability of network
memberships; and the relative insularity and
autonomy of networks. 
7 This sentence is quoted from a research
project currently led by Frédéric Mérand:
‘The European Security and Defence Policy
Domain: Network Ties, Beliefs System, and
Decision-Making’, Conseil de Recherches en
Sciences Humaines du Canada. 
8 Marks (1993) has taken into account both of
these phases when analysing European
integration in his first conceptualisation of
multilevel governance.
9 The UNDP is also a major stakeholder in the
CAR’s SSR process. This article, however,
specifically focuses on the EU’s role. 
10 The first version of the concept was presented
in 1998 by the then British Development
Minister, Clare Short, who presented SSR’s
purpose as ‘to ensure the efficient and
effective provision of state and human
security within a framework of democratic
governance’. The OECD/DAC has deepened
and conceptualised this initial British
approach to SSR.
11 Weiler (2009) has subtly analysed the
progressive assimilation of the SSR concept by
the European Commission in general and the
DG Dev in particular. 
12 Many French specialists of French African
policy have thoroughly analysed the dynamics
of this post-colonial policy. For a
comprehensive literature review of this topic,
see Bagayoko (2003 and 2010). 
13 France signed an official defence agreement
with the country which allowed French forces
to be permanently stationed in CAR. After the
1997 withdrawal of its military forces
(following two waves of mutinies within
Central African barracks), France maintained
a contingent of 220 soldiers and, in October
2006, strengthened this contingent by sending
supplementary soldiers when a rebel group
launched an attack against the government.
Besides direct military assistance, French
servicemen have also participated in training
Central African servicemen, whilst French
technical advisers work on a daily basis within
the Central African Ministries (Defence,
Interior, Customs, Justice, etc.). Since 2003,
the military cooperation between France and
the Central African Republic has been
characterised by the application of an
emergency plan, which is based on the
reorganisation of the Central African armed
forces (FACA) and its gendarmerie.
Significant support has also been provided to
the police forces.
14 The zaraguinas consist of Central Africans and
nationals of neighbouring countries,
particularly Chadian. They attack mainly
travellers on roads and widen their raids to
villages, taking advantage of the quasi-
absence of security authorities in the northern
regions. They particularly target breeders,
mainly Peulh nomadic communities, whom
they force to sell their cattle to pay a ransom
in exchange for their children held as
hostages. The attacks of zaraguinas have forced
some communities to set up self-defence units
in their villages. 
15 The approach developed by Ruth Hanau
Santini (2006) should be integrated into
analysis of the cognitive influence that
experts deployed in Southern partner-
countries can have on policymaking. Hanau
Santini advocates an approach based on the
relationship between French and German
foreign policy epistemic communities
(composed of experts as well as policymakers)
to analyse the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) and the elaboration of the
European Security Strategy.
16 In 2001, DG Relex created a ‘Conflict and
Peace Building Unit’ in charge of coordinating
the Commission efforts in conflict prevention.
17 Indeed, the framework for EC-led SSR
processes is the Country/Regional Strategy
Paper (CSP or RSP), which sets out the main
objectives and sector priorities for cooperation
for a seven-year term (six years for ACP
(Groupe des Etats d’Afrique, des Caraïbes et du
Pacifique (Group of African, Caribbean and
Pacific state) countries). More specifically,
SSR-related programmes are included within
National or Regional Indicative Programmes
(NIP or RIP) which detail specific activities
and expect results corresponding to the
strategic objectives of the CSP/RSP. DG Dev
and DG Relex have overall responsibility for
developing CSPs, in theory in close
collaboration with partner countries.
18 The EU Delegation in CAR is part of the
External Service of the European Commission
(Directorate General for External Relations).
However, the Delegation does not only
represent the Commission, but the EU as a
whole. In 2003 the EU Delegation’s
responsibilities expanded considerably as a
consequence of the devolution policy adopted
by the Commission in 2000. From then on, the
Delegation has covered all aspects – from
identification to implementation and
evaluation – of the EU external assistance and
aid programme. 
19 It is important to mention that the SSR
process in CAR is also shaped by interactions
between the different multilateral
stakeholders. Since 2005, international
donors’ coordination in partner countries is
meant to be based on the principles of the
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The
UNDP is the major multilateral partner of the
EU in the SSR process. Consequently, one of
the most important tasks of the EU
Delegation is to coordinate the EC SSR-
related programmes with those of the UNDP,
in order to clearly define roles and
responsibilities, and to avoid ambiguity about
divisions of labour that could hamper
implementation.
20 Currently, the Central African Republic is
divided into 16 prefectures, each placed under
the responsibility of a prefect. These
prefectures are divided into 66 sub-
prefectures, then into 175 municipalities.
Moreover, there are 8,800 villages or districts.
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21 Contrary to his predecessors, since he seized
power in 2003, General Bozizé cannot really be
accused of pursuing an ethnic policy in the
army. Recently, to satisfy the international
community (one of the major objectives of
security sector reform being to introduce a
better balance in the ethnic composition of the
armed and security forces), the Deputy
Minister of Defence launched a recruitment
drive, with 500 soldiers being recruited from
across the whole country. However, when
interviewed, servicemen (as well as gendarmes,
policemen, and customs officers) admitted that
only the Gbaya (the President’s ethnic group)
have authority, whilst the Yakoma (the ethnic
group of former President Kolingba) are
marginalised. All the highest positions are
occupied by members of the Gbaya group. 
22 Only a few researchers have investigated the
security decision-making processes in
Southern countries (Bastian and Hendrickson
2008).
23 According to Yves-Alexandre Chouala (pers.
comm.) ‘Historically and practically,
sovereignty has never been absolute and in
this sense, the Central African Republic has
never been a full sovereign state in the
security field. But, if one agrees that
sovereignty is more often conceived as the
room for manoeuvre and autonomy that a
state conserves in a constrained and relational
context, the Central African Republic
probably remains a sovereign security state’.
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